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Abstract Revenue collection services are deemed essential for attracting 
quality services on the networks. Generally these collections will be of small 
amounts but will be frequent. A water-tight authorisation check is not cost-
effective in such an environment. This paper introduces an inexpensive, 
robust  and fast scheme for authorising the credit usage. The scheme is 
especially suited to small credit brokers as it does not involve any special 
hardware. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In his recent article 'Digital Libraries, Value, and Productivity', Wiederhold 
[Wie95] declares "The services discussed in this article will require fees from 
customers. The fee for a unit of service must be fairly low, since many services 
will be needed to support decisions". Indeed, efficient systems for small 
amounts, high frequency revenue transactions are of paramount importance in 
attracting quality services on the networks. Credit and debit cards are widely 
used in the real world for payment of goods and services. Their usage is 
authenticated by physically producing a card and a signature at the point of its 
use. However, the use of these cards over a network is fraught with many 
difficulties.  Much of the difficulty results from the ability of the computers to 
duplicate information in a way that does not distinguish the original from a 
copy. This makes the use of simple account numbers as authorisation on a 
network unacceptable. 
In this paper we develop a simple scheme called Mudra1 that a small credit 
broker can adopt to provide a revenue transaction service over the networks for 
a community of consumers and service providers. The salient features of the 
scheme are its high-security, off-line operation and no need for any special 
hardware. 
For the purpose of this presentation we define a number of actors on a network. 
There are a number of service providers providing diverse services on the 
                                                          
1 Mudra is a Sanskrit word meaning coin(s). 
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networks. The consumers  use the services provided by these providers.  We 
assume the existence of a special class of service providers called creditors. A 
creditor undertakes to pay the service providers on behalf of the consumers. The 
consumers register with a creditor and are assigned account numbers. They 
must nominate sets of addresses at which they will access the services. A 
consumer seeking a service makes available to the service provider an account 
number and an address at which the service is required. We shall use the term 
capability to denote a pair of an account number and an address. The service 
provider verifies that the account is valid for the specified address before 
delivering any service to the address. As an acknowledgment for the service 
received, the consumer hands in an acktoken to the service provider. Finally, but 
not the least interesting actor on the network is a cheat. A cheat tries to have a 
service delivered at the expense of other consumers. The aim of this paper is to 
provide a revenue collection mechanism that is efficient and frustrates the 
cheats. 
An obvious solution is to provide a complete list of account number-address 
pairs (capabilities) to all service providers. Each request for a service is 
accompanied by a capability. The service is delivered only if it is demanded at 
an address (site) that the capability permits. The restricted nature of capabilities 
frustrates the cheats from gaining unauthorised access to the services. A typical 
consumer accesses network services from only a few sites. The added 
vulnerability of the accounts that are valid everywhere is thus avoided. 
The amount of data involved, however, makes the solution impractical. It entails 
a massive transfer of data to each service provider. It also requires a search over 
a large database to check that the consumer has a valid capability. Further, an 
enterprising service provider may find it too tempting and distribute unwanted 
advertisements to the addresses. 
In this paper we describe a practical implementation of the above idea. The 
implementation does trade-off some security for reduction in the amount of data 
needed to verify the capabilities. Some additional features of the 
implementation are: 
1. The security data is distributed in an encoded form. The coded data cannot 
be used to regenerate the original data. 
2. The amount of data needed by a service provider depends on the level of risk 
involved. Larger amount of data provides higher security. 
3. A cheat who succeeds in obtaining an unauthorised service from a provider 
does not automatically gain access to other services as well.  
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4. The basic idea outlined above is augmented to provide safeguards against 
cheating by a consumer or a service provider. 
5. The data structures needed in the implementation can easily grow or shrink 
as the consumer population changes. 
The item (3) above is unique to this scheme and has not been reported in the 
other electronic payment schemes. A comprehensive electronic payment scheme 
must counter unauthorised access to the services at three levels: 
1. Prevent a cheat from gaining access. 
2. Detect successful as well as unsuccessful attempts by cheats to gain 
accesses.  
3. Limit the access of a successful cheat to a small set of services and for a 
short period.   
A scheme focused exclusively on only one aspect is vulnerable and subject to 
security risks. The risk is especially serious if a cheat can attack the scheme off-
line or can remain anonymous by simply spreading the attempts to cheat over 
several service providers. 
We briefly survey the related works in Section 2 and bring out the issues of 
interest in electronic money transaction systems. In Section 3 we describe a bit 
hash algorithm and associated data structure for storing and verifying the 
capability base of the system. We analyse the risk inherent in the algorithm and 
show that it is low. An implementation of the algorithm on a network is 
suggested in section 4. We conclude the paper in section 5 with some remarks. 
 
RELATED WORK 
It is helpful here to characterise the nature of the services that the payment 
scheme described in this paper targets. The traditional services — services in 
the physical world — available from the remote sites have involved delivery of 
the goods and packets at a specified postal address or geographic location. The 
delivery could be easily coupled with the payment arrangements. At the very 
least, the delivery location provides assurances regarding the identity of the 
consumer. The nature of the services provided over the networks is radically 
different. These are services delivered from automated sources involving little 
human intervention. The traditional services have physical constraints on the 
number of services that can be delivered. Thus, delivering a service to one 
consumer excludes another consumer from receiving the same service. For 
example, a tube of toothpaste taken by a consumer from a supermarket shelf 
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reduces the number on the shelf by one. Likewise, a doctor examining a patient 
cannot serve another patient in the same time period. As opposed to these, a 
consumer playing a game over a network does not reduce2 the number of games 
that can be played later. Thanks to multi-programming, a game can concurrently 
be delivered to many consumers.  A perfect revenue collection scheme may not 
be essential in this environment. A collection service that collects most of  the 
payments is acceptable; especially if it is efficient, flexible and not too leaky. 
A number of proposals and products are available for effecting electronic 
transactions on the networks. Virtually everyone of them aims at providing high 
level of security with no leakage. A typical method uses encryption [RSA78, 
DiH76] to exchange information in a way that enables verification without 
revealing all details. For example, CyberCash (http:// 
www.cybercash.com) makes available to the consumers an RSA-based 
encryption tool. The consumer transmits the encrypted account information to 
the service provider. The service provider adds the transaction details to this 
information and sends it to the creditor for verification before delivering a 
service. NetCash (http:/ www.netbank.com/~netcash/) makes 
available small denomination coins that carry a sparse serial number. The idea is 
to ascertain that the number matches the claimed denomination. Double use of 
the coins is prevented through a close supervision of the transactions by a 
currency server. Mondex (http://www.mondex.com /mondex 
/home.htm) uses a Smartcard to create an electronic purse that can be used to 
pay real money over the networks. LETSystem (http:// www.u-
net.com/ gmlets/) allows the consumers and service providers to execute 
financial transaction through instructions to the creditor. On instruction from the 
consumer the specified amount is transferred from the consumer's account to the 
service provider's account. DigiCash (http:// www.digicash.com/) 
uses patented products to provide privacy (anonymity) without compromising 
the accountability on the part of its users [Cha92]. With suitable arrangements, 
it is possible to conduct off-line transactions under this system. The ESPRIT 
project CAFE [BBC94] also provides a system for financial transactions using 
custom-build hardware. Millicents from Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) 
(http:// www.millicent.digital.com/) provides a software script 
to handle the monetary part of the transactions. This big brother approach is not 
uncommon among the products from other card providers and banking groups.  
As can be seen, a typical transaction is completed with the aid of a server 
(creditor) trusted by both parties. These systems adequately address the needs of 
transactions involving larger amounts, but are too expensive for the small 
amount transactions that we expect will be common on the networks. The total 
                                                          
2 Here we are concerned with physical changes and ignoring issues like licensing. 
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cost of a complete transaction is double the cost of the provider's service if the 
creditor's service costs about the same as that of the service provider. The 
centralised nature of the clearing is also a bottleneck for many of the above-
mentioned systems. 
More recently, some proposals for micro-payment schemes have been made 
which do not require an on-line creditor to arbitrate on each payment. 
Electronic Lottery Tickets and Micropayments proposed by Rivest (http:// 
theory.lcs.mit.edu/~rivest/ publications.html) suggests a 
scheme where a creditor sells lottery tickets to the consumers which they use for 
purchasing services. A service provider only receives payments for winning 
tickets. Thus, the scheme overcomes the problem of excessively large number 
of uneconomically sized monetary transactions between the creditor and service 
providers. Further, the scheme relies on the law of large numbers to assert that 
each service provider will receive a fair payment and each consumer will pay 
their fair share. The scheme clearly suffers from its random nature which may 
place many service providers in severe and unnecessary cash flow problems. It 
also fails to address the issue of collusion between the parties.  
Rivest and Shamir [RiS96] have recently proposed two other payment schemes, 
PayWord and MicroMint. A transaction using PayWord requires consumers to 
create a chain of related pay-words using a hash function. A service provider 
can verify that the pay-words being given are from the same sequence by 
validating each payment (pay-word) against the previous pay-word received 
from the same consumer. It is, however, not clear how the scheme prevents a 
cheat (or service provider) from creating counterfeit pay-words. This in turn 
opens the possibility of a consumer repudiating the payment. The security of the 
scheme is simply based on the fact that a creditor will exclude from the scheme 
a consumer or a service provider who is involved in excessive number of 
disputes. It also requires that the service provider present the PayWord to the 
creditor no later than a day after receiving them. MicroMint can easily create a 
collection of easily verifiable coins. Though this is an improvement over 
NetCash scheme discussed earlier, it continues to rely on non-anonymous 
transactions and “vendors’ honest cooperation”  to prevent consumers from 
double spending. Further successful forging of the coins is possible. The 
proposers of the scheme suggest that this can be countered by creating new 
coins at the start of each time period or  even recalling all coins by declaring the 
period over. 
The discipline is still evolving, new proposals and protocols for payment 
schemes are constantly emerging. An excellent collection of links to network 
payment systems from established banks, credit card companies and just starting 
groups is available at http://ganges.cs.tcd.ie/ mepeirce 
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/Project/ oninternet.html. Another rich web site devoted to the 
issues is  http:// robotics.stanford.edu/ users/ 
ketchpel/ ecash.html. It is evident from the proposals surveyed in this 
section that money transactions on the networks have risks that are very 
different in nature from those in the physical world. Security has many facets 
each with its cost-to-benefit pay-offs.  It is, however, clear that none of the 
proposed payment schemes counter the cheats at all three levels identified in the 
introduction. 
Security is not the only requirement of a payment scheme. A paper describing 
NetCash [MeN93] introduces a number of useful requirements for electronic 
currency. Security against forging, anonymity to protect privacy, scalability that 
allows the system to avoid single server bottleneck, off-line operation to 
conduct transactions without creditors intervention, and independence from 
hardware are some of the desired properties of the electronic money. 
A transaction that a consumer can repudiate is clearly insecure. Chaum [Cha85] 
provides an insight into the security and privacy issues. We need a digital 
signature algorithm to create records of transactions that cannot be denied by 
the consumers. The basic idea of a digital signature is to have a pair of keys. 
One of the keys is a secret encryption key known only to the creator of the 
signed message. This key is used to encrypt (sign) the messages. The other key 
is a public decryption key that can be used to read signed (decrypt) messages3. 
There are algorithms available, see [Sim92] for a comprehensive collection of 
articles, that generate the pairs of encryption and decryption keys in which it is 
very difficult (that is, it costs more than the potential benefits) to construct 
encryption keys from the publicly available decryption keys.  Thus, anyone with 
access to the decryption key can read the message but cannot forge one.  
In remainder of this paper we present a scheme that provides a method for 
completing transactions without needing an on-line mediator. 
 
DATA STRUCTURE FOR REPRESENTING CAPABILITIES 
In this section we introduce algorithms  and data structures for efficiently 
encoding and verifying capabilities. The data structure is called multiple bit 
hashing tables [MSK95]. As the name suggests, this technique uses multiple 
hash tables. The key idea is to use a set of independent hash functions to encode 
capabilities onto a set of tables of bits. A hash function maps its argument 
capability onto an index over the table; that is, an integer in the range 1 through 
                                                          
3 In this paper, we use the terms encrypt and sign interchangeably. Similar remark applies to 
the terms decrypt and read a signed  message. 
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the size of the table. There is a table for each hash function. Initially, all bits in 
each table are cleared. The bits in a table are set by using its associated hash 
function. The functions are applied to a capability to generate indices – one 
index for each table. The corresponding bits in the tables are then set to 1. 
During verification of a capability, a similar procedure is followed. For each 
table, an index is obtained by applying the hash function to the capability. The 
bit at the indicated position is  examined. This procedure is continued to the 
next table if the bit is set. If the examined bits in all tables are found to be set 
then the capability is declared verified; the service provider may provide the 
service. If, however, a clear bit is detected during the verification, the capability 
is invalid and the service is denied.  
In order to illustrate the idea we present an example where we try to set three 
capabilities K = {<vmm,eecs.utas.edu.au>, <srini, 
ct.monash.edu.au>,  <vmm,ct.monash.edu.au>} in an empty data 
structure. We assume a total available space of 30 bits. The total space is 
divided into 3 hash tables T1, T2, and T3 of size 10 bits each. We also assume 3 
hypothetical hash functions h1(), h2() and h3() corresponding to these 
tables. The choice of the number of hash tables and the table sizes is an 
important factor as it determines the performance of the data structure. We 
discuss this issue later in this section. To start with, all the bits in the tables are 
clear.  In order to insert the first capability, <vmm, eecs.utas.edu.au> 
in the data structure, we apply the hash functions h1(), h2() and h3() to it. 
Let us assume that after applying the  hash functions we get the indices 1, 6 and 
2 respectively. Therefore the 1st bit of T1, 6th bit of T2 and 2nd bit of T3 are set 
to 1. Figure 1 shows the hash tables after inserting the capability. A similar 
procedure is followed to encode the other capabilities in the hash tables.  
Let us assume that after inserting all the capabilities, the hash tables appear as 
shown in Figure 2. In order to verify whether the capability <vmm, 
eecs.utas.edu.au> is present in the data structure or not, we apply hash 
functions h1(), h2() and h3() and get the resulting indices 1, 6 and 2 
respectively. Next we examine the 1st bit of T1, 6th bit of T2 and 2nd bit of T3. 
Since all these bits are set, we conclude that the capability is present in the data 
structure.  
The use of a set of single bits to represent a capability makes this technique very 
economical in terms of space. During verification, there are no string 
comparisons. This makes the process fast compared to the techniques which 
involve string comparisons. 
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A problem arises when a capability that is not present in the data structure (say, 
<cheat,pc.jail.edu>) returns the indices 3, 6 and 2 after applying the 
hash functions. In such a case, one would examine the corresponding bits and 
conclude that the capability exists, which is not true. This results in a false 
verification and constitutes a risk that is inherited in the system of providing 
service to a cheat. In what follows we show that the risk can be set to any 
stipulated small level in a proper design of a multiple bit hashing structure. 
Properties of multiple bit hashing 
In this section, we analyse and predict the risk that a creditor inherits by using a 
system of multiple bit hashing tables. For this purpose, we will assume that a 
hash function maps capabilities uniformly over the locations in the table. We 
shall derive an expression to determine the number of bits that are expected to 
be set as capabilities are mapped into a table of n bits. This result is then used 
to derive an expression for determining the risk in a system of t independent bit 
hashing tables.  
 
T1 T2 T3
1 1 0 0
2 0 0 1
3 0 0 0
4 0 0 0
5 0 0 0
6 0 1 0
7 0 0 0
8 0 0 0
9 0 0 0
10 0 0 0
Figure 1: Hash Tables after inserting the capability
<vmm,eecs.utas.edu.au>
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T1 T2 T3
1 1 0 0
2 0 1 1
3 1 0 0
4 0 0 0
5 0 0 1
6 0 1 0
7 0 0 0
8 1 0 0
9 0 0 0
10 0 1 0
Figure 2: Hash Tables after inserting all (three) capabilities
Let  
w  be the number of capabilities, 
t  be the number of tables used, 
n  be the number of bits in a single hash table, 
N  = ×n t , be the total number of bits used for the bit hash tables. This is 
also the total size of the data structure 
b  = N w/ , be the number of bits of memory available for each capability. 
Number of bits set in a table 
Let f i( )  be the number of bits set in a table of size n  after i  capabilities have 
been entered. It is easy to see that the following recurrence relation for f i( )  
holds: 
 f ( )0 0=  
 f i( )+ =1 bits set by first i capabilities 
      + probability that i +1th capability sets a new bit 
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  ( )= + −f i f i n( ) ( ) /1  
  ( )= + −1 1 1f i n( ) /        (1) 
The recurrence relation can be solved to get the following closed form solution: 
 f i n n
i
( ) = − −







1 1
1
  (2) 
By setting i w= , we get the number of bits set when all capabilities have been 
encoded into the table. For a typical (large) value of w  the expression (2) 
approximates to 
 
f w n e
w
n( ) ≅ −
−






1
  (3) 
Creditor's Risk 
The probability that an invalid capability hashes onto a set bit in a table is 
determined by the ratio of set bits to the total number of bits in the table, that is, 
f w n( ) / . A service provider will wrongly deliver a service if the capability 
hashes onto a set bit in each of the t  tables. Let error t b( , )  denote the 
probability of this event. Clearly, 
 error t N w f w
n
t
( , ) ( )= 

  
    
= − −









1 1
t
N
w t
  (4) 
      
≅ −
−






1 e
t w
N
t
 (as n N t= / ) 
 
error t b e
t
b
t
( , ) = −
−






1
  (5) 
It can be verified, using the standard methods of calculus, that this expression 
assumes its minimum value when 
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 t toptimal b e= = log 2   (6) 
It follows from this result that at the minimum risk, the organisation of each 
table has w e/ log 2  bits. This corresponds to f w n( ) / /= 1 2 . And, hence  
 
error toptimal b
b e( , )
log
=
−
2
2
 (7) 
The above expression denotes the creditors risk, so we write 
 risk b
b e( )
log
=
−
2
2
 (8) 
 
Bits-per-capability vs Creditors Risk
Bits per Capability
1E-22
1E-19
1E-16
1E-13
1E-10
1E-07
0.0001
0.1
1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100
 
Figure 3: Graph depicting the creditor’s risk as a function of bits used for 
encoding the capabilities. 
 
The graph in Figure 3 shows the creditor's risk against the number of bits used 
to encode a capability.  As can be seen from the graph, 30 bits per capability 
gives less than 1 chance in a million for a cheat to gain unauthorised access to a 
service. 
MUDRA: AN ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SERVICES 
The implementation of the proposed electronic payment service, Mudra, is 
woven around the capabilities. Each request for a service must be accompanied 
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by a capability. A service provider must verify the capability before accepting 
it. Thus, capability verification centres are fundamental to the scheme as the 
mechanism for verifying capabilities as being valid. 
Capability Verification Centres 
The bit hashing tables provide a practical method for capability verification on 
the networks. The creditor creates a large repository of hash functions. These 
functions are then used to fill bit-hashing tables with the encoding of current 
capabilities. Sets of these tables together with the associated hash functions are 
installed at the capability verification centres. Major service providers may have 
centres operating on their sites. The smaller ones may decide to pool their 
resources and use a common capability verification centre.  
The sets of tables installed at various centres need not be the same. Nor is there 
any need to place the same number of tables at each centre. The number of 
tables can vary between the centres and over time depending on the level of the 
required security. 
The tables kept at various centres, however, are not fixed. The tables will 
change as new consumers register with the creditor and as existing consumers 
leave the creditor. These changes will need the tables installed at capability 
verification centres to be updated regularly. It is easy to install new capabilities 
in the bit-hash tables. The deletion of the capabilities, on the other hand, is not 
simple. 
To add new capabilities the creditor needs to set new bits in the tables already 
installed at the verification centres. A new consumer will be able to receive a 
service from a service provider when all affected tables at the associated 
capability verification centre have been updated. As more centres get updated, 
the new consumers gain access to a wider range of services on the networks.  
A similar delay will be experienced before all capabilities of a resigning 
consumer are purged from the system. To this end, the creditor regularly 
replaces old tables from the capability verification centres by new tables 
containing the current capability encoding. Fortunately, not all centres need to 
be changed simultaneously. Nor is it necessary to replace all tables at a centre 
simultaneously. The tables can be replaced one at a time over an extended 
period of time. As one or more tables are replaced from a centre, the capability 
encoding of the resigned consumers cease to exist at the centre. To reduce the 
risk of an undetected cheat continuing to receive service from a centre it is 
useful for the replacement table to be based on a different hash function. This is 
also an opportunity to vary the size of the table in response to changes in the 
consumer population. 
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Transaction Acknowledgment 
The capabilities provide security against cheats but suffers from some annoying 
limitations. A service provider may double claim for a service. On the other 
hand, a consumer may deny having received a service. For example, suppose a 
service provider claims that a consumer used a capability to receive two 
services A and B. The consumer may insist that only one service was received. 
It is not possible to resolve the conflict without additional information. Another 
example of a difficulty is if a service provider makes available a consumer's 
capability to another provider. The latter provider may claim payment for a 
service without having provided any service. In rest of this section we focus on 
eliminating cheating by the consumers and service providers. This is achieved 
by augmenting the basic system with a procedure for acknowledging the 
services. To be useful each service must be acknowledged by a non-forgeable 
but distinct acknowledgment. 
The creditor creates a large number of signed acktokens and associates with 
each acktoken a pair of digital signature keys: an encryption key to sign the 
acknowledgment and a decryption key to read the signed acknowledgment. The 
decryption key is then signed by the creditor using her personal signature key. 
This is done to prevent the consumers from creating unauthorised keys. Each 
service provider knows the creditor's decryption key. They can use this 
decryption key to be sure that the decryption key being supplied by the 
consumer was created by the creditor. Each consumer receives a random set of 
these acktokens together with the signature key pairs. The use of signature keys 
is explained later.  
An acktoken is given by a consumer to the service provider as a part of the 
acknowledgment for the service. It is crucial to ensure that a service provider 
accepts an acktoken from a consumer only once. The fact that a service provider 
holds an acktoken that only the consumer (besides the creditor) knows is strong 
evidence that a service was provided. In the next couple of paragraphs, we 
present an algorithm for efficiently checking the uniqueness of the acktokens. 
Besides efficiency, the issue of security is also important – a consumer may not 
like to reveal an acktoken to the service provider before the service has been 
provided. 
The bit-hashing tables are once again a useful data-structure for ensuring the 
uniqueness of the acktokens received by a service provider from the consumers. 
The service provider may use a set of hash functions to convert consumer 
account-acktoken pairs into indices over the bit-hashing tables. These indices 
are recorded in an appropriate set of tables by the service provider. A duplicate 
acktoken is indicated if all indices generated by the hashing functions for the 
pair map onto the set bits in the tables.  
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If a standard set of hash functions are used for converting consumer's account-
acktoken pair into indices then the uniqueness check can be made without 
revealing the acktoken to the service provider. The consumer applies the hash 
functions and conveys the indices to the service provider. The service provider 
checks the indices against his data structure to either indicate that the acktoken 
is acceptable or to suggest that the consumer selects a different acktoken. The 
acktoken is given to the provider only after the service has been provided: the 
acktoken is placed by the consumer in a record together with the decryption key 
and other transaction details. The record is signed (encrypted) by the consumer 
before transferring it to the service provider. To ensure that the consumers use 
the correct signature-key pair with an acktoken, all acktokens are paired with 
their decryption keys by the creditor and signed before they are given to the 
consumers. The service provider receiving an acknowledgment record must 
decrypt the record and ensure that it is valid. 
The anonymity of the transactions is preserved as long as there is no dispute 
between the consumer and the service provider. At the end of each accounting 
cycle, the service provider requests for a payment of the fees for all services 
provided to an account. If the consumer and the service provider kept their 
records carefully, the creditor will easily be able to verify the consolidated fee 
from the consumer. There is no need for the creditor to know the transaction 
details. However, the creditor will need to call for the details if the parties 
disagree.  
A complete interaction between a consumer and a service provider is shown in 
Figure 4. The basic idea of the protocol is to first establish that a capability 
exists. This is done in step marked 1 in the figure. The consumer transmits the 
account number and address where the service is required. An eavesdropper will 
not benefit as the capability check will fail if the service is requested for a 
different address. The consumer and the service provider then negotiate an 
acktoken that the consumer will use to acknowledge the service. Steps 2 and 3 
represent this negotiation. At the end of step 3, the provider has verified that a 
valid capability exists and the parties have chosen an acktoken to be used for 
acknowledging the service. However, the provider needs to confirm that the 
consumer owns the acktoken. Only an owner of an acktoken has the encryption 
key associated with it. Steps 4, 5 and 6 provides this confirmation. The 
consumer sends a decryption key signed by the creditor. The service provider 
responds by sending a random number challenge in step 5. The consumer 
encrypts the number to convince the service provider that he has the encryption 
key. The interaction secures the capability system against a cheat who is able to 
spoof [Bel89] an address. The service provider agrees to provide a service in 
step 7. The request for a service is made by the consumer in step 8. The request 
is signed by the consumer and may carry some additional details. The idea is to 
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create an evidence for a request in case the consumer fails to transmit an 
acknowledgment after the service. The last two steps 10 and 11, show the 
exchange of an acknowledgment between the consumer and the service provider 
on completion of the service.  
The algorithm provides a method for completing financial transactions on the 
networks between two parties – a typical transaction is expected to conclude 
successfully. However, the transactions may not complete successfully for four 
reasons: 
• a system failure, 
• a dishonest consumer transmitted incorrect indices in step 2, 
• a dishonest consumer failing to execute step 10 after receiving a service, or 
• a dishonest service provider failing to provide the requested service in step 9. 
The records of interactions preceding a failure provide information for 
identifying the interacting parties. In this sense the present scheme is superior to 
other reported in the literature which fail to even establish if the two parties 
were involved in an interaction or one is just alleging that the other cheated. 
However, it may not always be possible to determine the erring party. A 
consumer or a service provider who is frequently involved in disputed 
transactions loses goodwill and eventually would be excluded by the 
creditor(s).To limit their exposure to dishonest consumers a provider of an 
expensive service may consider payments on per-stage basis. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The conventional approaches to revenue collection are based on encryption and 
passwords. The lynch pin of these approaches is the secrecy that makes it 
difficult for a cheat to guess the keys. However, once a cheat has guessed a key, 
the compromised system is open to exploitation. The identity of the cheat is 
often very difficult to trace. Even the fact that the system has been compromised 
may not be detected until other follow-up consequences emerge. The corrective 
actions may involve extensive overhaul of the system. These may require the 
system to be closed to normal business while an extensive time consuming 
overhaul is performed. A perfect, absolutely secure payment system is a worthy 
but an unrealistic goal. A pragmatic scheme must aim for high reliability and 
ability to function gracefully even when a part has been compromised. Currency 
systems in the physical world exhibit these characteristics and remains 
functional in spite of the counterfeit currency notes, defrauded cheques and 
misused credit cards. A three prong strategy was suggested in the introduction to 
manage the risks in an electronic payment scheme.  
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The method proposed in this paper exploits the fact that a typical consumer uses 
the network only from a small set of fixed addresses and thus makes the 
transactions secure. The nature of the capabilities prevent their use at addresses 
other than the nominated sites (addresses). A concerted attack by guessing 
capabilities needs to be for a single site and to the same capability verification 
centre. This is easily detected; thus, the service is provided in an environment 
where the identity of the interacting parties is well established. One is unlikely 
to indulge in a misdemeanour if the actions are easily traced back to them. The 
efficiency of the method depends on the risk level that the service demands. A 
lower risk level is attained by using more tables. The method is robust and does 
not need an immediate overhaul if a cheat breaks into the system. The cheat gets 
access to only a part of the system services and that too for a limited period. 
Even if a cheat remains undetected, the access to a service will eventually 
terminate as the tables are replaced and renewed at the capability verification 
centres. Indeed, the scheme thwarts a cheat’s attempt to gain access at all three 
levels identified in the introduction. 
Another strong point of the proposed scheme over the other schemes is its 
scalability and off-line operation. The transactions complete without any 
intervention from a central authority. This makes it a useful system that needs 
only small setting-up and running cost. The creditors are not required to keep 
their systems on-line around the clock. Nor does the scheme require any special 
custom-build hardware for its implementation.  
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1 <Account_number, Address>
{f(Account_number, Acktoken)| f() is a standardised S
C 2 hash function} E
R
O 3 Ok V
I
N <Decryption_key, Consumer’s Account_number, C
4 Expiry_date> signed by the creditor E
S
A random number challenge to test that the consumer 
U 5 has the encryption key P
R
M 6 Response to step 5: Encrypted random number O
V
E Ok, if provider could decrypt and match the encrypted I
7 random number D
R E
Request for service: R
Time <Provider’s_identification, Decryption key, Request>
8 signed by the consumer
9 Service
Consumer acknowledges service:
<Decryption_key, Acktoken, Transaction_details>
10 signed by the consumer
The service provider acknowledges the service: data in
11 step 10 signed by the provider
Figure 4: A complete transaction between a consumer and a service provider.
The consumer starts by declaring a capability (Step 1). If the service
provider can verify the capability, the consumer continues to provide
enough further information to let the provider be sure that the acktoken
will not be a repeat (Step 2). A certified decryption key is then sent to the
provider (step 4) who in turn ensures that the consumer holds the
encryption key (steps 5-7). The request for the service (step 8) is sent
after the provider has verified that the consumer is genuine. After the
service, the consumer (step 10) and the service provider (step 11)
exchange signed (encrypted) acknowledgments for the service.
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